

We claim

1. A method of signing and authenticating a message  $m$  in a public key data communication system, comprising the steps of :
  - 5 in a secure computer system;
  - (a) generating a first short term private key  $k$ ;
  - (b) computing a first short term public key derived from said first short term private key  $k$ ;
  - (c) computing a first signature component  $r$  by using said first short term public key  $k$ ;
  - 10 (d) generating a second short term private key  $t$ ;
  - (e) computing a second signature component  $s$  by using said second short term private key  $t$  on said message  $m$ , said long term private key and said first signature component  $r$ ;
  - (f) computing a third signature component  $c$  using said first and second short term private keys  $t$  and  $k$  respectively, and sending said signature components  $(r, s, c)$  as a masked digital signature of said message  $m$  to a receiver computer system; in said receiver system;
  - 15 (g) using said second and third signature components  $(s, c)$  computing a normal signature component  $\bar{s}$  and sending said signature components  $(\bar{s}, r)$  as a normal digital signature to a receiver verifier computer system; and in said verifier system
  - 20 (h) verifying said normal signature.
2. A method as defined in claim 1, said first short term private key  $k$  is an integer and said first short term public key is derived by computing the value  $kP = (x_1, y_1)$ 
  - 25 wherein  $P$  is a point of prime order  $n$  in  $E(Fq)$ , wherein  $E$  is an elliptic curve defined over  $Fq$ .
3. A method as defined in claim 2, said first signature component  $r$  having a form defined by  $r = \bar{x}(\text{mod } n)$  wherein  $\bar{x}$  is derived by converting said coordinate  $x_1$  to an integer  $\bar{x}$ .
  - 30

4. A method as defined in claim 3, said second short term private key being an integer selected such that  $2 \leq t \leq (n-2)$ , and said second signature component being defined by  $s = t(e + dr)(\text{mod } n)$ , wherein  $e$  is a hash of said message  $m$ .
5. A method as defined in claim 4, said third signature component being defined by  $c = tk(\text{mod } n)$ .
6. A method as defined in claim 5, said normal signature component  $\bar{s}$  being defined by  $\bar{s} = c^{-1}s \text{ mod } n$ .
7. A method of generating a digital signature  $S$  of a message in a data communication system, wherein the signor of the message has a private key  $d$  and a public key  $y$  derived from an element  $g$  and said private key  $d$ , said method comprising the steps of:
  - (a) generating a short term private key  $k$ ;
  - (b) computing a first short term public key derived from said short term private key  $k$ ;
  - (c) computing a first signature component  $r$  by using said first short term public key  $k$ ;
  - (d) generating a second short term private key  $t$ ;
  - (e) computing a second signature component  $s$  by using said second short term private key  $t$  on said message  $m$ , said long term private key and first signature component  $r$ ;
  - (f) computing a third signature component  $c$  using said first and second short term private keys  $t$  and  $k$  respectively;
  - (g) sending said signature components  $(r, s, c)$  as a masked digital signature of said message  $m$  to a receiver computer system.
8. A method as defined in claim 7 including the step of in said receiver computer system, using said second and third signature components  $(s, r)$  computing a normal

signature component  $\bar{s}$ , and sending said signature components  $(\bar{s}, r)$  as a normal digital signature to a verifier computer system, and verifying said normal signature  $(s, r)$  by said verifier system.

- 5     9.     A method as defined in claim 8 including the step of in said receiver system, using said second and third signature components  $(s, c)$  computing a normal signature component  $\bar{s}$ , to derive a normal digital signature components  $(\bar{s}, r)$  and; verifying said normal signature components.
- 10    10.     A processing means for assigning a message  $m$  without performing inversion operations and including a long term private key contained within a secure boundary and a long term public key derived from said private key and a generator of predetermined order in a field, said processing means comprising:  
within said secure boundary;  
15     means for generating a first short term private key;  
       means for generating a second short term private key;  
       means for generating a first signature component using at least said second short term session key; and  
       generating a masked signature component using said first and second short term  
20     session keys to produce masked signature components of said message  $m$ .
11.     A processing means as defined in claim 10, including means for converting said signature components to a normal signature component; and  
       means for transmitting said normal signature components to a recipient.

25